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Abstract:  We study annuity rates in Chile and relate them with industry competition, finding: a) 
that annuity insurance companies paying higher broker commissions paid lower annuity rates; and 
b) a structural break of the long-run elasticity of annuity rates to the risk-free rate in 2001.   
Moreover, this structural break coincided with the submission of a new draft pension law proposing 
greater transparency in annuity markets and a generalized drop in broker commissions.  The high 
commissions charged in the 1990s were partly returned to annuitants as informal (and illegal) cash 
rebates.  Myopic pensioners preferred cash rebates over present values. Thus, the legal threat caused 
the drop in broker commissions, reduced the illegal practice of cash rebates, increased competition 
via annuity rates, and raised the long-run elasticity to one.  
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ANNUITY MARKETS IN CHILE: COMPETITION, REGULATION—AND MYOPIA? 
 
Between 1993 and 2003 the long-term risk-free rate in Chile fell by 3.2 percentage 
points, while the cost of an annuity increased by less than 12.3 percent, implying a very low 
implicit elasticity. This article estimates the long-term elasticity of annuity rates issued by 
life insurance companies (defined as the internal rate of return on expected future annuity 
payments) to changes in the market risk-free rate. It also examines interactions between the 
annuity rates and broker commissions as two alternative instruments of competition and 
checks whether there were structural breaks related to key regulatory actions.  These 
questions are of general interest because, in defined-contribution pension systems, many 
pensioners are expected to purchase annuities upon retirement, and elasticities significantly 
smaller than one could indicate lack of competition via annuity rates. This result would be 
troublesome in the context of a mandatory pension system, because it could reveal failures 
in the last link in the long pension chain. 
 
We find several interesting results. First, the estimated long-run elasticity increases 
rapidly after 2001, and the hypothesis that it is statistically equal to one cannot be rejected 
after that period.  Second, this structural change is significantly related to a generalized 
drop in broker commissions.  Third, both facts coincide with the submission to Congress of 
a new draft pension law proposing the creation of an electronic market for pension 
annuities and the imposition of a cap on commissions.  Fourth, we find evidence that 
annuity insurance companies that paid higher commissions also paid lower total annuity 
rates.  It is likely that higher commissions allowed more room for brokers to provide 
informal (and illegal) cash rebates to pensioners.  This, in the case of myopic pensioners, 
reduced competition via annuity rates and increased competition via advance cash 
payments, despite the lower total present value received by the pensioner.  The overall 
evidence indicates that the threat caused by the draft law (which was only passed in 2004) 
caused a generalized drop in broker commissions, which reduced the scope for cash 
rebates, increased competition via annuity rates, and caused the elasticity to become 






AR Annuity  rate 
BC Broker  commissions 
CRV Annuity  cost 
IRR  Internal rate of return  
LICO  Life insurance company 
PRC20  20-year bond issued by the Central Bank of Chile 
SAFP  Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones (Superintendency of 
Pension Fund Administrators) 
SVS  Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros (Superintendency of Securities and Insurance)
TVA  Tasa de venta ajustada (commission-adjusted annuity rate) 
TV  Tasa de venta (annuity rate) 
UF  Unidad de Fomento (Unit of account of price-indexed contracts) 
  
1.  INTRODUCTION AND HYPOTHESES 
Many countries have reformed their pension systems in a similar way to Chile’s 
reform of 1981. This reform was intended to provide reasonable self-financed pensions 
upon retirement, freeing the state from onerous future liabilities, caused in part by 
insufficient individual voluntary saving for retirement. The Chilean reform implied the 
privatization of social security and the creation of a fully funded, privately managed 
pension system with individual (fully portable) savings accounts that can be used 
exclusively for retirement purposes.  
 
At retirement, most individuals typically have two choices: to withdraw the 
accumulated funds over time following a certain rule (programmed withdrawal) or to buy 
an annuity, sold in Chile by closely regulated life insurance companies. Each choice carries 
different types of risk: a longevity risk, which only an annuity covers, and an investment 
risk, which either the pensioner or the insurance company assumes in full.
1 
 
Because many pensioners opt for annuities (more than 60 percent in the Chilean 
case),
2 we need to understand the incentives faced by annuity insurance companies in this 
context. In particular, we want to know whether and how changes in the local risk-free rate 
are transmitted to annuity rates. In this paper, we define the annuity rate (TV) as the 
internal rate of return on expected future annuity payments.
3  
 
This is a theoretically simple question, but since the answer depends on the extent of 
competition in the insurance industry and the variables used for such competition, it is not 
obvious from an empirical perspective. Indeed, figure 1.A shows the time trend of the 
estimated inflation-adjusted cost of an annuity for a 65-year-old pensioner with no 
beneficiaries and compares it to a 20-year central bank interest rate (PRC20).
4 For many 
years this was the longest maturity interest rate, and (as we will argue later) it adequately 
represents risk-free investment opportunities for the life (annuity) insurance companies 
(LICOs). The inverse relationship, as expected, is apparent. However, considering the 
starting and ending points, we observe that the PRC20 rate dropped from 7.2 to 4 percent. 
With an estimated Macaulay duration of about eight years for the annuity, its cost should 
have increased by more than 25.6 percent, but it did only so by 12.3 percent. A simple 
regression of the logarithm of the annuity cost on this interest rate level (with several lags) 
gives a total coefficient of –3.2, and relating changes in annuity costs to interest-rate 
changes yields a slope coefficient of –2.6. These coefficients are unexpectedly low. Figure 
1.B offers a tautological explanation for these findings: annuity interest rates start below the 
                                                 
1 Lump-sums are restricted in Chile.  For a detailed description of the Chilean pension system see 
Superintendency of Pension Fund Administrators (2003). For a description of potential pension modalities, 
see Edwards and Valdés (1998). Variable annuities were introduced in Chile in 2004. 
2 See the website of the pension supervisor (SAFP): www.safp.cl. This number underestimates the 
effective proportion of retirees that choose annuities, since it includes disability and survivorship pensioners. 
3 These expected payments are based on the (outdated) RV85 mortality table. This implies an 
overestimation of the level of annuity rates but should not significantly affect their changes through time. 
However, see section Determinants of Annuity Costs, below. 
4 In the Data section below, we explain the sources. In every case we use “real” (inflation-adjusted) 
interest rates.  2 
risk-free rates (with negative spreads) and end above it (positive spreads). Interpreting an 
annuity as a long-term (special) bond issued by a LICO, the reported spread behavior is 
puzzling. 
 
Here we estimate the long-term elasticity of annuity rates to market risk-free interest 
rates and also examine the evolution of this parameter through time. In light of the 
preliminary evidence presented, we also look for structural changes.  
 
We believe these questions are important for several reasons. First, the sensitivity of 
the annuity cost to changes in market interest rates should partly reflect the degree or form 
of competition within the industry. If competition takes place via annuity rates, they should 
fully reflect changes in interest rates. In fact, we expect a long-term elasticity close to one. 
This implies an interesting question because the preliminary evidence indicates sensitivity 
significantly smaller than one. Such result may be a matter of concern for the regulatory 
authorities because this is the last link in a mandatory defined-contribution pension system. 
On the other hand, the behavior of annuity rates indicates that a structural change may have 
occurred, and that the elasticity may have changed. The causes of such a change are 
interesting to study. Finally, from a normative perspective, this parameter is important for 
determining the kind of investment strategies that, to head off future pension risks, pension 
funds should follow as future pensioners approach retirement age.  
 
We find a number of interesting results. First, there is indeed evidence of a 
structural break in the long-term elasticity of changes in annuity rates to changes in the 
risk-free rate. Until the first quarter of 2001, the elasticity is significantly smaller than one, 
and from that point on it becomes statistically equal to one. The parameter change 
coincides with a large generalized drop in broker commissions. There is a statistically 
significant correlation between the two facts. They also coincide with a discussion in 
Congress of a new draft pension law proposing the electronic auctioning of annuities and a 
cap on broker commissions. We also find evidence that the LICOs that paid higher broker 
commissions paid lower total (adjusted) annuity rates.
5 It is therefore likely that higher 
commissions allowed more room for brokers and annuitants to liquefy pensions (through 
informal cash payments to the pensioner by the broker). This, in the case of myopic 
pensioners (forced to save all their lives), reduced competition via annuity rates and 
increased competition via commissions and the associated advance cash payments, even 
though, in present value terms, the pensioner could be losing money (as evidenced by the 
lower total interest-rate cost paid by the LICO).  
 
We use the term myopia in the sense of high subjective discount rates, which would 
explain both the need for mandatory savings and the preference for advance cash payments 
(which partly undo the lifetime mandatory savings). However, we cannot rule out broker 
abuse of uneducated consumers, resulting in situations where the annuitants got limited 
cash rebates and a large share of the high fees ended up in the brokers’ pockets. So, in this 
                                                 
5 Adjusted annuity rates (TVA) correspond to the internal rate of return of expected future payments, 
after deducting commissions from the premium paid by the annuitant, so they correspond to the effective 
interest-rate costs paid by the LICOs. 3 
case we need to assume irrationality or lack of education to explain how high-commission 
annuities were sold in the first place, when pensioners get no associated extra benefits.  
 
Since the reform, we can safely conclude annuitants today get a much better deal. 
The evidence is mostly consistent with the interpretation that a legal threat caused a 
generalized drop in commissions. This reduced the slack for pension dilution (or broker 
abuse), increased competition via annuity rates, and caused the elasticity to become 
indistinguishable from one. 
 
2.  DETERMINANTS OF ANNUITY COSTS 
From the perspective of a LICO, the process begins when an agent (broker) contacts 
a potential pensioner and induces him/her to exchange the balance in the (mandatory) 
individual retirement account for an annuity. The agent, who may represent several 
different LICOs, gets a commission for this service (usually measured as a percentage of 
the initial down payment or premium). Figure 2 shows the non-adjusted and adjusted 
annuity rates (TV and TVA, respectively) and the corresponding spread due to 
commissions. A fraction of this commission may be returned to the pensioner as an 
informal advance cash payment or rebate, implying that the pension is “liquefied.” This 
marketing practice was illegal, but was apparently common during the 1990s. These 
incentives are expected to exist if the pensioner, forced to save during his/her entire active 
life, cannot take a lump-sum and is given the opportunity to withdraw informally some of 
the money in advance. (Although commissions have fallen, there is no information 
regarding how the decrease has changed net of cash payouts to the pensioner.) 
 
Evidently, this transaction generates a long-term liability for the LICO. From this 
perspective, the relevant interest rate is the commission-adjusted interest rate (tasa de 
venta ajustada, TVA). Regulations require that, in addition to the premium paid by the 
pensioner, equity holders in the LICO must put in new equity. This can be achieved in two 
ways. First, the maximum leverage ratio is 15. Second, there is a relatively strict norm, 
based on asset-liability cash-flow matching requirements, that the unmatched liability cash 
flows must be discounted at rates notably lower than market rates. This implies that the 
calculated present value of the liability is larger than the net premium received by the 
LICO, which is reflected as an immediate accounting loss in the equity value, meaning that 
shareholders must put up additional equity. 
 
An important question is whether this additional equity requirement in itself is a 
direct cost that should be deducted from the interest rate paid to the annuity holders. If there 
is access to capital markets the answer is negative because if the new equity is invested in 
financial instruments traded in capital markets at fair prices, the transaction has zero net 
present value.  
 
However, from the perspective of a LICO other costs are associated with a new 
annuity, which can be categorized as operating or administrative, financial and technical. 
Financial costs are associated with eventual mismatching of asset-liability cash flow (or 
duration); technical costs are related to mortality table risk and consist of systematic 
underestimation of life expectancy.  4 
 
Regarding mortality table risk, by definition it is impossible for all pensioners to 
live more than the average life expectancy. However, mortality tables may be outdated, 
underestimating life expectancy. This means that the estimated (reported) annuity interest 
rates, calculated using these outdated mortality tables, will be biased downward.
6 
 
2.1    Modigliani-Miller and the Expected Elasticity 
From the perspective of a pensioner, whether a home-made annuity is feasible is an 
important question. If the age at death is known with certainty, it is feasible using a ladder 
of risk-free bonds. If the pensioner cannot build the ladder, the LICO cannot provide one 
either without assuming risk. Recognizing the longevity risk, the pensioner should be 
willing to give up a fraction of his/her pension in exchange of longevity insurance. 
However, if longevity risk is largely diversifiable at no cost, in a competitive annuity 
industry the pensioners should not be charged for it.
7 
 
An annuity can be interpreted as a long-term bond guaranteed by a LICO. If 
annuities are priced (as corporate bonds are) in highly competitive and informationally 
efficient markets, the main determinants of their interest rates should be the long-term, 
default-free rates and LICO credit risk. General credit-risk results should also be directly 
applicable to this case. Applying Acharya and Carpenter’s analysis of corporate defaultable 
bonds (2002), and assuming that long-term matching risk-free assets do exist, the price of 
an annuity At should be 
) 1 ( t t t c B A − =         (1) 
where Bt is the price of a matching default-free bond and ct is the value of the default option 
held by the LICO equity holders, expressed as a fraction of the value of the default-free 
bond.  It corresponds to the option of buying the risk-free bond with the LICO’s assets, so 
the underlying asset is the riskless bond and the exercise price is the assets’ value. The 
default option is valuable if the asset-liability ratio is “high”, if there is significant 
mismatching and/or if assets are risky.  However, it is important to note that, given an 
asset-liability ratio, investing in riskier assets (with higher interest rates or spreads) not 
necessarily implies that higher interest rates should be paid on annuities. Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) prove that equity absorbs the risks in the first place and that only when risk 
becomes “large” is it shared with debt holders.  
 
In any case, determining whether the option to default is valuable is an empirical 
matter. Considering that debt-equity ratios have been much lower than their legal maximum 
(11 versus 15),
8 despite mismatching, that LICO portfolios tend to be conservative, and that 
risk-ratings have been in general above (local) AA, we conjecture that the default option is 
not significantly valuable. 
                                                 
6 For example, assume constant annual payments for 25 years and an interest rate of 4 percent. If we 
wrongly assume that the payments will take place only during 22 years, the reported interest rate will be 3.2 
percent. 
7 Here we think of diversification at the LICO shareholders’ level.  We do not mean to say that 
longevity risk is diversifiable within each LICO. 
8 However, we need to keep in mind that these leverage ratios are calculated with outdated life-
expectancy tables such that the true economic leverage may be larger. 5 
To model the annuity elasticity with respect to changes in the risk-free interest rate, 
let 
*
t A  be the reported annuity cost, which underestimates the true annuity cost by 
t t t t B A A u / ) (
* − = . We can rewrite equation (1) as  
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where y* is the reported annuity rate and D• are the corresponding modified durations.  
 
Following Acharya and Carpenter (2002), an interesting implication of (1) is that 
when interest rates fall (increase), the value of the riskless reference bond increases 
(decreases), but the default option value (to purchase a more valuable underlying asset) also 
increases (decreases) ( 0 / log < dy c d t ), assuming that the assets’ value (the exercise price) 
increases by less. This is the case if the assets have lower duration or if they are riskier than 
liabilities. The implication of the measurement error is similar: when interest rates increase 
(decrease) the present value of the farther away cash flows falls (rises). Therefore, from 
(2’), if the option to default is valuable or if measurement error is significant, annuity 
interest rates should fall (increase) by less than the risk-free rates, and the elasticity may be 
lower than one, even if the reference bond and the annuity have the same durations. On the 
other hand, an elasticity equal to one should imply no significant default risk or significant 
mismeasurement, assuming efficient markets. 
 
In any case, we may expect reported annuity interest rates to be lower than the risk-
free rates, even if a small risk premium may have to be added to it, because (1) reported 
rates underestimate true annuity rates; (2) operational costs have to be subtracted from asset 
returns; and (3) eventual additional premiums, related to mismatching and mortality table 
risk, may have to be charged to the annuitant, if they cannot be diversified.  
 
2.2    The Case of Chile 
Since 1993, the Chilean fixed-income market has had 20-year inflation-indexed 
bonds issued by the central bank. Its Macaulay duration was about 8 (9) years at the 
beginning (end) of the sample period. Given the duration of an annuity, this instrument 6 
offers good asset-liability matching opportunities and is a useful reference point in the 
sense that it should be used to set the rates of the marginal annuities.
9 
 
With this in mind, the evidence presented in figure 1.B indicates an interesting 
evolution of the annuity-rate spreads (defined as the annuity rate minus the risk-free rate): 
they were negative by more than 1 percentage point at the beginning of the sample period 
and became positive toward the end. Between 1993 and 2003, we find an increase of 169 
basis points in the average spreads (table 1.A). Measurement error arguments cannot 
explain this; only very significant increases in risk levels could.
10 However, even under this 
hypothesis, the negative initial spreads are hard to understand. Furthermore, the risk 
argument would contradict any unit elasticities that might exist. The explanation may 
therefore lie elsewhere. 
 
3.  THE DATA 
In this section we describe the data that are used for the different estimations, its 
sources, and present a few descriptive statistics. 
 
3.1    The Original Data 
The original annuities data come from the Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros 
(SVS). SVS keeps records of annuity interest rates and also of average market 
commissions, which were reported annually until 1999 and quarterly after that. Average 
annual rates are presented in table 1.A. The adjusted annuity rates (TVA) represent the 
effective interest-rate cost for the LICOs. To estimate this cost, we must subtract the broker 
commission from the annuity premium and recalculate the internal rate of return with the 
new (lower) initial payment. For example, in the case of perpetuities, the cost is equivalent 
to dividing the interest rate by one minus the percent commission of the sales agent. To 
estimate the TVA, we assume that the average commission is constant throughout the 
corresponding reporting periods (annually at first and then quarterly). The same 
information is presented in figure 2, but in terms of annuity interest rates before and after 
commissions, and the corresponding spread. Table 1.B shows additional descriptive 
statistics. The reference interest rate (PRC20) was obtained from transactions data the last 
trading day of the month at the Santiago stock exchange (Bolsa de Comercio de Santiago). 
 
3.2    Annuity Payment Profile 
Figure 3 shows the payment profile for a 65-year-old pensioner with no 
beneficiaries, for a premium of 1,000 UF
11 and a real interest rate of about 5 percent per 
                                                 
9 See Data section, Annuity Cost Behavior.  
10 For example, in the US for 10-year bullet bonds, such an increase would be associated with a drop 
in risk ratings from significantly above to significantly below investment grade. See for example 
www.bondsonline.com .  
11 The UF (Unidad de Fomento) is the indexed (inflation-adjusted) unit of account.  It is calculated as 
follows: given an initial value expressed in pesos for the day 9 of a given month (say, Ch$17,000) the ending 
value of the UF for day 9 of the following month is calculated as Ch$17,000(1+inft-1), where inft-1 is the 
inflation rate of the previous month. The quantity Ch$17,000(inft-1)/n, where n is the number of days in a 
month, is successively added to the previous day’s value of the UF.  7 
year. Such a profile is obtained from the official mortality tables (RV85) used by the LICOs 
until 2003. Considering this payment profile and the annuity interest rates, we obtain 
estimated annuity costs. 
 
3.3    Annuity Cost Behavior 
With the adjusted annuity rates (TVA) and the profile just described, we estimated 
an index representative of the annuity cost (CRV). For descriptive purposes, it can be 
related to the TVA. Considering that interest rates changed significantly in the sample 
period, we estimated the durations in a slightly unconventional way, as a function of 
interest-rate levels, and by doing so we take into account that durations change with 
interest-rate levels. Notice that we do not assume an adjustment lag or anything of that sort. 
It is just an ad hoc definition. Table 2 shows empirical estimations of the annuities’ 
modified duration and (marginal) convexity.  
 
Given the relationship that (by definition) exists between the annuity cost and the TVA, the 
regression adjustment is almost perfect. The (empirical) modified duration (which measures the 
percentage change in the annuity cost given a 1 percent change in its interest rate) turns out to be 
10−44TVAt-1. For example, for an adjusted interest rate of 4 percent, the modified duration is 8.24. 
The (empirical marginal) convexity (which accompanies the quadratic term) is 22. For comparison, 
we perform the same exercise for a PRC20 total return wealth index, which assumes monthly 
investment in a new PRC20. We get a modified duration of 9.72−32PRC20t-1. With 4 percent 
interest rates, the modified duration is 8.44. The empirical or residual convexity of this instrument is 
marginally larger than that of the annuity. 
 
We can thus conclude that the PRC20 may be a reasonable instrument for matching LICO 
assets and liabilities, at least in the case of 65-year-old male. However, it is important to keep in 
mind that many of the annuities paid by insurance companies actually correspond to early retirees, 
and for that purpose the duration of the PRC20 is too short. 
 
3.4    Causality Relations 
As part of the descriptive information, it will prove useful to perform Granger 
causality tests. Considering the full sample and the interest-rate levels, several statistical 
criteria indicate an optimal lag of about 3 months. Considering changes in interest rates, the 
optimal lag is 2. Table 2.C shows the results. As expected, they indicate that PRC20 
interest-rate levels and changes “cause” the levels and changes in annuity interest rates. The 
inverse relation does not exist, implying that annuity interest-rate levels and changes do not 
anticipate future interest rates. These results do not change much considering other sample 
periods.  
 
4.  METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Here we estimate the long-term elasticity of annuity interest rates to changes in the 
risk free rates, look for structural changes and present robustness checks. 
 8 
4.1    Long-Term Elasticity  
One purpose of this study is to determine the long-term elasticity of the annuity cost 
to the relevant long-term interest rate (equation [1’]). This is equivalent to estimating the 
annuity interest-rate elasticity to the same variable (equation [2’]). We use the second 
alternative, since the interpretation is clearer. Our hypothesis is that the elasticity is equal to 
one, which would be true if the chosen risk-free rate adequately represents the marginal 
cost of an annuity and if risk or mismeasurement considerations are unimportant.  
 
Because some time must elapse between the sale of the annuity and the official 
recording and reporting of the sale, a lag is to be expected, particularly if we use month-
end, risk-free interest rates. It may also take time for the LICOs to adjust their business 
strategies to changing market conditions. We thus estimate the following equation: 
t t t t t t PRC b PRC b PRC b TVA a TVA ω ρ τ τ + Δ + + Δ + Δ + Δ + = Δ − − − 20 ... 20 20 1 1 0 1  (3) 
With this specification, to have at least part of the changes in the risk-free interest rate 
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l b .  
Results are presented in table 3. We used two lags, given the results presented in the 
previous section. If we also include the contemporaneous market rate, the coefficient is 
essentially zero and does not affect the results. The sum of the coefficients b1 and b2 is 0.3; 
it is highly and significantly different from zero (table 3.B). The coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable is 0.34522, which gives a long-term elasticity of 0.466, which is 
significantly smaller than 1 (table 3.B). Thus, the evidence so far contradicts the hypothesis 
that changes in the long-term interest rate are fully transmitted to the annuity cost.  
 
4.2    Structural Changes  
Given the observed evolution of the spreads between the annuity costs, of the risk-
free interest rate and of the reported commissions (figures 1.B and 2.A) a reasonable doubt 
arises about whether long-term elasticity has changed. With this in mind, equation (1) was 
estimated with rolling 36-month samples. With each estimation, we verified the hypotheses 
0 2 1 = +b b  and  ρ − = + 1 2 1 b b  with likelihood ratio tests. Our results, shown in figure 4.A, 
are eloquent. The sum of the coefficients b1 and b2 is always significantly different from 
zero. Furthermore, after mid-2001 the long-term elasticity  ) 1 /( ) ( 2 1 ρ − +b b  becomes 
statistically indistinguishable from one. This means that evidence of a structural change is 
clear and that all of the market interest changes were fully transmitted to the annuity costs 
during the last three sample years. 
 
4.3    Robustness Checks 
Here we present robustness checks of our results, by considering alternative dependent 
(unadjusted annuity rates) and independent (term-structure-adjusted risk free rates) variables. 9 
4.3.1   Unadjusted Annuity Rates 
We repeated the rolling estimation exercise using the (unadjusted) annuity interest 
rate received by the pensioner. Results are presented in figure 4.B. They are essentially 
similar to those found using the adjusted interest rate or TVA. It even looks as if these 
unadjusted interest rates began their adjustment earlier. 
4.3.2   Relevant Market Interest Rate  
LICOs might consider a different interest rate as the relevant one for determining 
the annuity cost considering that the payment schedule of the PRC20 is flat and biannual, 
whereas expected annuity payments are monthly and decreasing.  
 
To consider this possibility, we performed the following exercise. First, we 
estimated the end-of-month term structure of interest rates between 1993 and 2003 using 
bonds issued by the central bank of Chile, based on the Nelson and Siegel (1987) 
parametric representation. With the estimated term-structure parameters, we obtained a full 
set of monthly zero-coupon prices. Then, we used these prices to determine the monthly 
present value of the annuity and the corresponding series of internal rates of return.
12 Figure 
5.A shows the evolution of the estimated annuity cost and Figure 5.B its internal rate of 
return (IRR). The regression R
2 of running the IRR against the PRC20 rate is 0.99, and the 
slope coefficient is insignificantly different from one with a p-value of 15 percent. Thus, for 
the purposes of this study, no term-structure-related errors seem to affect the results. 
 
5.  INTERPRETATION  
Summarizing, so far we have documented the following facts: first, at market 
interest rates the annuity costs increased by 30 percent, whereas the total price charged to 
pensioners increased only by 12 percent. This happened because spreads between the 
adjusted annuities interest rates and the reference rates (PRC20) were negative at the 
beginning of the sample period and became positive toward its end (figure 1.B).
13 Second, 
reported commissions have dropped (table 1 and figure 2). Third, the annuity interest-rate 
elasticity to market interest rates was significantly smaller than one and turned statistically 
indistinguishable from one. Thus, we should see what changes in the industry might explain 
these noteworthy adjustments in the annuity parameters. 
 
                                                 
12 Calculation details are available from the author upon request. 
13 Given the reasoning presented in the previous sections, it is hard to understand why annuity rates 
end above the risk-free rates, especially if they are underestimated in outdated mortality tables. It is as if 
competition may have taken annuity rates “too far.” The evidence analyzed in James, Song, and Vittas (2001) 
is consistent with the idea that annuity rates in Chile are “too high” toward the end of the sample period. 
There are several possible explanations for this: (1) risk is much higher than what we assume it to be; (2)) 
irrationality (or agency problems) influence  LICO behavior; (3) there are generalized (market-timing) bets on 
interest-rate increases (which itself may be rational or irrational, depending on the efficiency of the local 
financial market); (4) some LICOs may also be assuming conscious losses in order to acquire dominant 
market shares. This needs further study. However, even if, from the LICO’s perspective, annuities are sold 
with negative net present value, this need not imply bankruptcy or be reflected as negative margins in the 
financial statements.  10 
The drop in commissions coincides with the date the elasticity became statistically 
equal to one, and both changes coincide with a generalized drop in interest rates. Jointly, 
these facts probably indicate that these changes reflect intensified competition via interest 
rates in the annuity industry. The very fact that commissions fell is likely to indicate more 
competition. We now analyze the evidence further to check this conjecture. 
5.1    Commission Levels 
A potential indicator of the degree of competition is the commission level. It may be 
argued that if part of these commissions is returned to pensioners it may be a bad indicator. 
However, in view of the generalized drop in interest rates, it is likely that LICOs may have 
to compete more actively through annuity rates. To verify this, we regressed the (log of) the 
long-term elasticity reported in figure 4.A against commissions, measured as interest-rate 
spreads (figure 2). We also included the interest-rate level as an additional regressor to see 
whether the drop in interest rates alone explained the structural change. Results, presented 
in table 4, confirm the latter conjecture. The effect of interest rates on the long-term 
elasticity is not significant, but the level of commissions is.
14  
 
5.2    Commissions and Adjusted Annuity Interest Rates  
Whether the pensioner ends up with a worse deal (lower net present value) with an 
advance cash payment when the commission is increased is also of interest.
15 One way to 
check this is to verify whether LICOs that paid higher commissions (partly returned to the 
annuity buyer) obtained cheaper financing, by paying a lower total interest-rate cost on 
their annuities. To study this, we need detailed information at the LICO level, which has 
been available since 2001. 
 
We performed the following exercise. First, we estimated the adjusted interest rates 
(TVA) using LICO-level annuity interest rates (TV) and broker commissions (C), 
controlling for market share (p), for each month and for each LICO, considering a 65-year-
old pensioner with no descendants. Using a panel data specification we estimated the 
following:  
it it it it i o it it e TV TVA c p c c PRC TVA + − + + = − − ) ( 20 2 1 ) ( 2      (4) 
and 
it it it i o it it u C c p c c PRC TVA + + + = − − 2 1 ) ( 2 20       (5) 
 
Market share was used as an additional control variable, to consider the possibility 
of systematic differences. In any case, given eventual endogeneity problems, we also 
estimated the equations using lagged market shares and excluding this variable altogether. 
Results do not change much. 
 
We used several panel data specifications (common constant for all panel members, 
lagged dependent variable, fixed effects, and random effects). Results are presented in table 
                                                 
14 We tried with one interest rate and several different lags (one at a time due to multicolinearity), 
and the results did not change significantly. 
15 See footnote 6. 11 
5. Part A shows the results of estimating (4) and part B, of (5). Results are quite consistent 
with each other, and in this sense they seem robust. In every case, we verify the hypothesis 
that higher commissions are associated with lower adjusted interest rates. Depending on the 
specification, an additional percentage point in commissions is related to a lower interest-
rate cost between 9 and 18 basis points.
16  
 
To further understand the importance of this result, assume for example that the 
annuitant pays 1, 1-c is received by the LICO and c by the broker. To simplify, let us work 
with perpetuities and assume that they are a function of this commission, A(c).  We find 
that that the adjusted annuity rate R(c)=A(c)/(1-c) decreases with c (dR(c)/dc<0).  






























   (6) 
implying that 
dc c R c dA ) ( ) ( − <       (7) 
Therefore, even if annuitants get all of the higher commissions back as rebates, it is 
actuarially unfair, since the annuity falls by more than the interest rate times the additional 
commission.  In other words, from the perspective of the pensioner, higher commissions 
definitely are associated with lower net present values. 
 
5.3    Changes through Time  
Considering the possibility that our results are driven only by the significant drop in 
commissions, we reestimated (2) in successive rolling quarters. Because these are 
essentially cross-sectional regressions, we did not subtract the PRC20 interest rate, and we 
used a common constant. Results are presented in figure 5, together with the LICO-level 
commissions. We do find that the significantly negative relationship between commissions 
and adjusted annuity rates exists only until mid-2001 and then disappears. 
 
5.4    Other Evidence 
Additional evidence is consistent with the idea that the reported structural changes 
are due to changes in competition levels or attributes. Indeed, in November 28 of 2000 
begins the official Senate discussion of a new draft pensions law to implement a mandatory 
system of electronic annuity auctions, which would also impose a cap on commissions.  
Among other things, this new law would have established that “(pension fund) affiliates 
may select one of the three best pension offers or any other offer which is at least equal to 
the average of the top three [annuity rates] minus 2 percent”, which would indirectly limit 
the maximum pension dilution.  In addition, it “forbids insurance companies, brokers, sales 
agents and other people intervening in the process of selling annuities to offer incentives or 
benefits other than those established in the law, with the purpose of contracting pensions 
using this modality”.
17 
                                                 
16 For the specification with the lagged dependent variable, we divided the commission coefficient (–
0.0304) by one minus the average coefficient on the lagged dependent variable.  
17 See Diario de sesiones del senado, publicación oficial legislatura 343ª. See references. 12 
 
The commission levels (figures 2 and 5) had already dropped in the first quarter of 
2001. Thus, it seems likely that the industry used the reduction as a “self-regulation signal” 
(or first move) to influence the legislative debate.
18 Because this legal change also meant 
changes in competition mechanisms, the reduction may have been an attempt to accelerate 
sales. An indirect indicator of this probability is the cross-sectional dispersion in monthly 
market shares, which peaked first in 2001 (and then more permanently in 2003, indicating a 
more permanent market concentration).  
 
6.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
The objective of this paper has been to estimate the long-term elasticity of annuity 
interest rates to changes in market interest rates, but this investigation disclosed several 
other interesting facts. We believe this is an important question in the first place because 




From a public policy perspective, it would be worrisome to find that annuity rates 
do not reflect financial market conditions. That would mean that, after a long accumulation 
phase in the mandatory pension system, pensioners at the beginning of the payout phase 
would leave a significant portion of their lifetime savings in the hands of brokers and 
annuity insurance companies in the form of “excessive profits” (reflected in cheap 
financing costs). This absurdity might be due to myopia (“the original sin”) on the part of 
the pensioners, accepting advance cash payments in exchange for actuarially unfavorable 
annuity payments.  
 
This study indicates that, between 1993 and 2003, annuity costs measured by market 
interest rates increased by 30 percent, while the actual cost charged to pensioners by LICOs 
increased only by 12 percent. This happened because annuity interest-rate spreads with 
respect to the risk-free rate (PRC20) were negative at the beginning of the sample period 
and turned positive at the end of it.  
 
Results also indicate that annuities have always been sensitive to market interest 
rates, but until 2000 only a small fraction of interest-rate changes was transmitted to 
annuity interest rates (with a long-term elasticity between 20 and 40 percent). From that 
point on, we cannot reject the hypothesis of a unitary elasticity, which means that changes 
in market rates are fully reflected in annuity interest rates. This structural change is 
significantly related to a generalized drop in broker commissions. The higher elasticity and 
the lower costs coincided with the discussion in Congress of a draft law that would have 
forced an electronic auction of annuities and imposed a cap on commissions. In addition, 
we find evidence that companies that paid higher commissions also paid lower total 
(adjusted) interest-rate costs on annuities.  
                                                 
18The softer version of this law approved in 2004, indeed imposed a cap on fees, and created a fairly 
transparent information system of annuity quotations for potential pensioners, but without the obligation of 
choosing among the top three.  See references. 
19 This elasticity is also important for determining the investment policies that that pension funds 
should follow to immunize pensions (Walker 2003). 13 
 
An explanation that is consistent with all the combined evidence is that higher 
commissions allow more room to liquefy pensions (advance cash payments or rebates to 
the pensioner by the broker), which in the case of myopic pensioners reduces competition 
via pensions and increases it via advance cash payments, even though the total net present 
value received by the pensioner is lower. In summary, our results are consistent with the 
interpretation that the legal threat caused a generalized drop in broker commissions, 
reducing the slack for pension dilution, increasing competition via annuity rates, and 
causing the elasticity to increase and become equal to one.  
 
There are two competing explanations, coming from very different angles. First, we 
cannot rule out that annuitants got modest cash rebates and that a large part of the higher 
fees just ended up in the broker’s hands—broker abuse of uneducated consumers. This 
story uses irrationality or lack of education to explain how high-commission annuities were 
sold in the first place, when pensioners got no compensatory extra benefits. In this case, we 
can conclude that today’s annuitants almost certainly get much better deals.  
 
Another possible explanation is risk: that spreads increase due to higher credit risk 
of life insurance companies. There may be some truth to this, since a generalized drop in 
interest rates significantly increases LICO debt and debt-to-equity ratios, if assets and 
liabilities have been mismatched. However, this explanation is hard to reconcile with the 
initial negative spreads and with the fact that since 2001 the long-term annuity rate 
elasticity to changes in the risk-free rate has become equal to one, something that should 
happen only if risk is relatively low. Risk can neither explain why life insurance companies 
that paid higher commissions also paid lower adjusted annuity rates. We thus believe the 
evidence is more consistent with our interpretation of myopic incentives. 14 
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Figure 1:  Annuity Costs, Market Rates, and Interest Rates 
 































































Note: The annuity cost index (CRV) is calculated as the scaled present value of expected future 
payments, using the RV85 mortality table for a 65-year-old male pensioner with no beneficiaries, and 
“adjusted” annuity rates (TVA). Adjusted rates correspond to the effective internal rate of return paid by life 
insurance companies, which excludes from the premium paid by the annuitant the commissions paid to the 
brokers. PRC20 corresponds to the Central Bank long-term indexed bond interest rate. 

















































































Note: TVA corresponds to the “adjusted” annuity rate using the RV85 mortality table for a 65-year-
old male pensioner with no beneficiaries. Adjusted rates correspond to the effective internal rate of return paid 
by life insurance companies, which excludes from the premium paid by the annuitant the commissions paid to 
the brokers. PRC20 corresponds to the Central Bank long-term indexed interest rate. 16 







































Note: TVA corresponds to the effective internal rate of return paid by insurance companies, which excludes 
from the premium paid by the annuitant the commissions paid to the brokers. TV is the effective interest rate 
(IRR) obtained by the annuitant, calculated using the total premium paid and the expected future payments 
received. In all cases, we use the RV85 mortality table for a 65-year-old male pensioner with no beneficiaries.  17 
Figure 3:  Annuity Payment Profile 
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Note: The profile is for a male, age 65, no descendants, premium of 1000 UF (see footnote 10), 
market rate 5.07 percent, using the RV85 mortality table. 18 
Figure 4:  Estimated Elasticity of Adjusted and Unadjusted Annuity Rates to Changes in the 
Reference Risk-free Rate 
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Note:  Estimated equation:  t t t t t PRC b PRC b TVA a TVA ω ρ + Δ + Δ + Δ + = Δ − − − 2 2 1 1 1 20 20 . The figure 
shows rolling estimations of  ) 1 /( ) ( 2 1 ρ − +b b (LT_ELAST), p-values of the restriction  0 ) ( 2 1 = +b b  (P1) 
and of the restriction  ) 1 ( ) ( 2 1 ρ − = +b b  (P2) 
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Note:  Estimated equation:  t t t t t PRC b PRC b TV a TV ω ρ + Δ + Δ + Δ + = Δ − − − 2 2 1 1 1 20 20 . The figure 
shows rolling estimations of  ) 1 /( ) ( 2 1 ρ − +b b , p-values of the restriction  0 ) ( 2 1 = +b b  (P1) and of the 
restriction  ) 1 ( ) ( 2 1 ρ − = +b b (P2) 19 
Figure 5:  Estimated Monthly Annuity Cost and Internal Rates of Return 
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Note: Calculations of the indexes representing the cost of an annuity are based on the full term structure of 
interest rates (CRV_E0) and on the effective interest rates paid by LICOs (CRV).  
 








93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03
TVA_E0 PRC20
 
Note: Internal rates of return of the annuity cost for LICOs estimated using the full term structure of interest 
rates (TVA_E0) versus the long term risk free rate.  20 


































































Note: Moving Quartlerly Panel Regression of the equation TVAit = c0+c1pit+c2(TVAit-TVit).  The 
acronym before the symbol “_” represents a specific life insurance company. In each case the difference 
between “adjusted” (TVA) and unadjusted (TV) annuity rates is plotted.  “COM_COEFF” and 
“COM_TESTT” represent the regression slope coefficient (c2) and the corresponding t-test, respectively. 21 
Table 1:  Annual Averages and Descriptive Statistics 
 












1993 5.17 4.26 5.74  6.83 
1994 4.77 4.26 5.33  5.93 
1995 4.84 4.84 5.48  6.20 
1996 5.10 4.98 5.77  6.17 
1997 5.01 5.33 5.72  6.45 
1998 5.56 5.28 6.29  7.32 
1999 5.33 5.95 6.15  6.54 
2000 5.37 5.90 6.19  6.42 
2001 5.24 3.94 5.77  5.53 
2002 4.93 2.67 5.28  4.56 
2003
a 4.18 2.70  4.51  3.91 
Average 5.07  4.61  5.56  6.05 
a.Until August.  
Sources: (1) Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros; (2) Bolsa de Comercio de Santiago.
 
B. Descriptive Statistics 
Statistic  PRC20 TVA 
TVA- 
PRC20(-2)  TVA-TV 
 Mean   0.060256   0.056862  -0.003916   0.006229 
 Median   0.061400   0.057390  -0.004960   0.006664 
 Maximum   0.084600   0.065279   0.010017   0.008786 
 Minimum   0.036700   0.043670  -0.019999   0.003266 
 Standard 
deviation 
 0.009409   0.004881   0.005597   0.001623 
 Skewness  -0.790931  -0.790634   0.222732  -0.560318 
 Kurtosis   3.631803   3.578910   3.054669   2.217609 
        
 Jarque-Bera   15.11179   14.76848   1.049101   9.728959 
 Probability   0.000523   0.000621   0.591821   0.007716 
        
 Sum   7.532000   7.107753  -0.489547   0.778576 
 Sum of squared 
deviations 
 0.010979   0.002954   0.003884   0.000326 
        
 Observations   125   125   125   125 
 
Note: TV corresponds to the internal rate of return obtained by the annuitant. TVA is the adjusted 
annuity rate paid by the insurance companies, which deducts broker commissions from the premium. Both 
rates are estimates using the RV85 mortality table for a 65-year-old male with no descendants. PRC20 is the 
interest rate of an indexed central bank annuity-type bond. 22 
Table 2:  Empirical Duration and Convexity of Annuities, Long-Term Interest Rates  
and Causality Tests 
 
A. Annuity Duration and Convexity 
Dependent variable: DLOG(CRV) 






B. Duration and Convexity of a Total Return (index of investing in PRC20) 
Dependent variable DLOG(IPRC20) 






C. Granger Causality 
Sample: 1993:01 2003:12 
Hypotheses Obs  F-Statistic  Probability 
 PRC20 n.c. TVA (Lags: 3)  124   34.9951   3.2E-16 
 TVA n.c. PRC20   0.40836   0.74728 
 D(PRC20) n.c. D(TVA) (Lags: 2)  123   49.0612   2.9E-16 
 D(TVA) n.c. D(PRC20)   0.41652   0.42634 
Note: TVA corresponds to the “adjusted” annuity rate using the RV85 mortality table for a 65-year-
old male pensioner with no beneficiaries. Adjusted rates correspond to the effective internal rate of return paid 
by life insurance companies, which excludes from the premium paid by the annuitant the commissions paid to 




Table 3:  Long-Term Elasticity Estimation 
 
A.  Relationship between Interest Rate Changes   
Dependent variable: D(TVA) 
Sample 1993:05 2003:08 
Observations: 124 
Variable Coefficient Standard  error t-statistic Probability 
D(TVA(-1)) (ρ)  0.3452 0.0657 5.2542 0,0000 
D(PRC20(-1)) (b1) 0.1599 0.0218 7.3078 0,0000 
D(PRC20(-2)) (b2) 0.1449 0.0245 5.9108 0.0000 
CONSTANT (a) 0.0000 5.28E-05 0.0828 0,9341 
R-squared 0.5922   Average  Dependent 
Variable 
–0.000118 





0.0005  Akaike information 
criterion 
–12.04 
Sum squared residuals  4.01E-05  Schwarz criterion  –11.95 
Log likelihood  750.56  F-statistic  58.10 
Durbin-Watson 2.1469   Probability(F-statistic)  0.0000 
 
Note:  Results of estimating  t t t t t PRC b PRC b TVA a TVA ω ρ + Δ + Δ + Δ + = Δ − − − 2 2 1 1 1 20 20 .  
TVA corresponds to the “adjusted” annuity rate using the RV85 mortality table for a 65-year-old male 
pensioner with no beneficiaries. Adjusted rates correspond to the effective internal rate of return paid by life 
insurance companies, which excludes from the premium paid by the annuitant the commissions paid to the 
brokers. PRC20 corresponds to the Central Bank long-term indexed interest rate. 
 
B. Hypotheses 
b1+b2 = 0 
Test statistic  Value  DF  Probability 
F-statistic 97.235 (1.  120) 0.0000 
Chi-square 97.235 1 0.0000 
  
b1+b2 = 1-ρ 
Test statistic  Value DF  Probability 
F-statistic 30.212 (1.  120) 0.0000 
Chi-square 30.212 1 0.0000 
 24 
Table 4:  Long-Term Elasticity versus Interest Rate and Commission Levels 
 
Dependent variable: LOG(LT_ELAST) 
Method: Generalized Method of Moments 
Sample: 1995:02 2003:08 
Observations: 103  
Variance-covariance adjusted using a Bartlett kernel with fixed bandwidth (4), 
no prewhitening 
Simultaneous weighting matrix and coefficient iteration 
Instruments: PRC20(-2) TVA-TV C 
Variable Coefficient Standard  error t-statistic Probability 
PRC20(-2) –9.5417 6.0331 –1.5815 0.1169 
TVA-TV –154.47 30.911 –4.9972 0.0000 
C 0.6744 0.2191 3.0773 0.0027 
R-squared 0.7288   Average  Dependent 
Variable 
–0.8796 





0.2172  Sum squared residuals  4.7216 
Durbin-Watson   0.2953  J-statistic  4.15E-29 
 
Note: Results from regressing the rolling coefficient (b1+b2)/(1-ρ) against long-term interest rates 
and commissions.  TVA (TV) corresponds to the “(un)adjusted” annuity rate using the RV85 mortality table 
for a 65-year-old male pensioner with no beneficiaries. Adjusted rates correspond to the effective internal rate 
of return paid by life insurance companies, which excludes from the premium paid by the annuitant the 
commissions paid to the brokers. PRC20 corresponds to the Central Bank long-term indexed interest rate. 
Unadjusted rates correspond to the internal rate of return received by the pensioners. 25 
Table 5:  Adjusted Annuity Rates versus Commissions (Panel Regressions)  
 
Simple period: 2001:1 - 2003:10 (34 months) 
Different LICOs: 21 
Total number of obs. (unbalanced panel): 553 
A. Explanatory Variable: Broker Commission (X=C)    
 Regression  Type 
  Simple*   Lagged Dependent* Fixed Effects*  Random Effects 
Constant 0.7888 0.2103      0.7713 
t-test  20.5494 5.5699   13.8779 
Comission (C)  –0.1429 –0.0304  –0.1810  –0.1778 
t-test  –18.2339 –3.6939  –25.1292  –22.2234 
Market share (p)  –0.0797 0.2547 2.4068  2.1209 
t-test –0.3564 1.4179 7.9998  6.7970 
TVAit-1-PRC20t-3  0.6670    
t-test  22.977    
R-squared 0.3197 0.6318  0.5990  0.5976 
Adj. R-squared  0.3172 0.6297  0.5823  0.5962 
Regression standard 
error 0.2600 0.1797  0.2033  0.1999 
Log likelihood  –38.1528 160.1250  107.9990  
Durbin-Watson 0.6531 2.0471  1.0969  1.0846 
Avg. Dep. Var.  0.3019 0.3241  0.3019  0.3019 
Std. Dev. Dep. Var.  0.3146 0.2954  0.3146  0.3146 
Sum of Squared Resids.  37.1687 16.3587  21.9088  21.9821 
F Statistic.  129.2222 40.4762  35.9848  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000 0.0000  0.0000     
B. Explanatory Variable: X=TVA-TV 
  Regression Type 
Variable  Simple*   Lagged Dependent* Fixed Effects*  Random Effects 
Constant 0.7816  0.2110     0.7604 
t-test  21.0700  5.6590   13.9642 
Commission (TVA-TV)  –1.2117  –0.2608  –1.5346  –1.5098 
t-test  –18.8536  –3.7694  –25.8782  –23.6732 
Market share (p) –0.1224  0.2472  2.3835 2.1123 
t-test –0.5615  1.3745  8.1120 6.9687 
TVAit-1-PRC20t-3    0.6620    
t-test   22.396     
R-squared 0.3385  0.6321  0.6236 0.6224 
Adj. R-squared  0.3361  0.6301  0.6080 0.6210 
Regression Standard 
Error  0.2563 
0.1796 
0.1970 0.1937 
Log likelihood  –30.3765  160.40  125.5211  
Durbin-Watson 0.6735  2.0423  1.1618 1.1504 
Avg. Dep. Var.  0.3019  0.3241  0.3019 0.3019 
Std. Dev. Dep. Var.  0.3146  0.2954  0.3146 0.3146 
Sum of Squared Resids.  36.1379  17.043  20.5635 20.6296 
F Statistic.  140.7520  302.51  39.9151  
Prob(F-statistic) 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000     
*Variance-covariance matrix adjusted by heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using White  26 
Note: results of estimating the equation  it it it i o t it u X c p c c PRC TVA + + + = − − 2 1 ) ( 2 20  with two 
specifications for X: broker commission as percentage of the insurance premium and expressed as the 
difference between adjusted and unadjusted annuity rates. TVA (TV) corresponds to the “(un)adjusted” 
annuity rate using the RV85 mortality table for a 65-year-old male pensioner with no beneficiaries. Adjusted 
rates correspond to the effective internal rate of return paid by life insurance companies, which excludes from 
the premium paid by the annuitant the commissions paid to the brokers. PRC20 corresponds to the Central 
Bank long-term indexed interest rate. Unadjusted rates correspond to the internal rate of return received by the 
pensioners. 
 